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INHERENTLY FEMALE CASES OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A
GENDER-NEUTRAL ANALYSIS
Suzanne D'Amico*
INTRODUCTION
Scenario 1: Imagine being nineteen years-old, on welfare, and
giving birth to a son. Imagine your son died as a result of your
inability to breastfeed adequately. Now imagine the state is prose-
cuting you for killing the child.
Scenario 2: Imagine a woman, so disenchanted by her role as
mother that she cruelly punished her newborn son by denying
him his only source of nourishment-her breastmilk. Imagine a
two-month-old infant, his skin dangling from his frail body be-
cause his mother failed to feed him. Now imagine the state is
prosecuting her for killing the child.
These two extremely different portrayals both were used to de-
scribe Tabitha Walrond, a young mother found guilty of criminally
negligent homicide after her two-month-old son died from malnu-
trition.' Her case was unusual because while it is rare for a baby to
die as a result of a woman's inability to produce enough breastmilk
to adequately nourish a child, it is even more rare for a woman to
be prosecuted for such conduct.2
The decision whether or not to prosecute this case was extremely
controversial,3 with compelling arguments on both sides. However,
this Comment will not analyze the decision to prosecute. Rather,
this Comment will examine how the portrayal of Ms. Walrond by
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2001; B.A., Speech Pa-
thology, magna cum laude, Loyola College, 1998. I would like to thank Professor
Deborah Denno for her assistance with this project.
1. Nina Bernstein, Placing the Blame in an Infant's Death; Mother Faces Trial
After Baby Dies from Lack of Breast Milk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1999, at B1.
2. Id.
3. Compare Editorial, Breast-Feeding as Manslaughter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
1999, at A26 (stating that "[e]xpert testimony on how difficult it is for many nursing
mothers to recognize the danger signs by themselves and evidence that the medical
system let this young woman down suggest that this is not a case that should be prose-
cuted."), with Editorial, Breast-Feeding Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at A20 (sug-
gesting that it is a myth that it is difficult to measure the nourishment of a breast-fed
baby).
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the defense and prosecution, and in the media, reflects gender ste-
reotypes in the criminal law and society.
The prosecution depicted Ms. Walrond as a woman scorned by
the father of her son, as someone who attempted to have an abor-
tion to prevent having a child, and as an individual who simply re-
jected motherhood-a bad mother.4 In contrast, the defense
portrayed her as a good mother who was simply a victim of circum-
stance, failed by her family, the medical system, and society.5 Ms.
Walrond's unique circumstances and conduct challenged tradi-
tional conceptions of female roles because they did not fit neatly
within the good mother/bad mother dichotomy of motherhood.
Although courts are constantly confronted with mothers who
have harmed their own children, some cases are unusual.6 For ex-
ample, one scenario to emerge in recent years is the situation of
women who are prosecuted for exposing their infants to drugs in
utero.7 Cases such as these and that of Tabitha Walrond present an
even greater challenge to the criminal justice system because these
offenses are "inherently female" in that only females can perpe-
trate these crimes, yet these crimes are so reprehensible that they
completely contradict society's feminine ideal of women as docile,
passive caregivers.8
Relying upon traditional conceptions of female roles like the
ones used by the attorneys in the case and by the media to portray
Ms. Walrond does a disservice to all parties involved in these pros-
ecutions. It forces upon the defendant the role of either good
mother or bad mother. Once she is so labeled, both judge and jury
view her as such, frequently ignoring her specific situation. Simi-
larly, the prosecutor is constrained by such stereotypes in that the
defendant may be treated either too harshly or too leniently simply
4. Nina Bernstein, Trial Begins for Mother in Breast-Fed Infant's Starvation
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1999, at B7.
5. Id.
6. See generally JACK C. WESTMAN, LICENSING PARENTS: CAN WE PREVENT
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT? (1994) (discussing the frequency of incompetent
parenting in our society and situations of mothers harming their own children).
7. See generally Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WO-
MEN'S L.J. 278 (1990) (discussing the incidence of in utero drug exposure receiving
nationwide attention from the media, the judicial system, and the legislature).
8. Although male child abuse offenders are prosecuted, society accepts some
level of male violence as normal, while it more heavily stigmatizes female offenders.
E.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IowA L. REV. 95, 137 (1993)
("[M]ale criminologists who studied gangs in the United States and Britain over the
past forty years 'vicariously identified' with the delinquent boys, romanticizing their
deviance. Female criminologists have shown little affinity toward their female crimi-
nal subjects.") (citations omitted).
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because of what she represents, as opposed to what she actually
has done.
This Comment presents a gender-neutral approach to dealing
with child abuse offenders. The treatment women receive in the
criminal justice system is often based more on who they are and
what they represent in society, than on their conduct. 9 The woman
who does not fit the traditional role of woman and mother is
treated harshly by the court, the media, and society; the woman
who fits the role of ideal mother is treated more leniently. 10 If the
offense alone were considered and not the gender of the offender,
a more fair application of child abuse laws would result. This ap-
proach, however, runs the risk of ignoring the uniqueness of a wo-
man's situation in child abuse cases. Therefore, completely
eliminating consideration of gender characteristics may not be the
most desirable approach to such inherently female cases. This
Comment will propose ways to balance this conflict.
Part I of this Comment introduces child abuse offenses that can
be committed only by women and examines the legal basis for
prosecuting those offenses. Part II discusses cases of offenses by
men that are analogous to the female offenses and compares char-
acteristics of male and female child abusers. Part III argues that
stereotypes stemming from the social perception of parenthood are
pervasive throughout the justice system, creating a disparity in the
treatment of male and female offenders. This Comment concludes
that a gender-neutral approach to prosecuting child abuse cases,
particularly the inherently female offenses, would alleviate this
disparity.
I. INHERENTLY FEMALE CmLD ABUSE OFFENSES
A. Abuse and Neglect in the Context of Breastfeeding
The Walrond case is an extremely rare instance of a mother be-
ing prosecuted for her failure to adequately breastfeed her new-
born son.1 Until this case, breastfeeding issues in the law were
raised primarily in the family law setting.' 2 Cases arose in the con-
9. Id. at 107.
10. Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 75, 99 (1993) ("Mothering is taken out of its context in abuse
prosecution and is judged by a judiciary that assumes middle-class, sexist, and racist
norms. Mothers-across classes and cultures-are expected to perform in ways that
satisfy those norms.").
11. Bernstein, supra note 1, at B1.
12. ELIZABETH N. BALDWIN, BREASTFEEDING AND THE LAW, at http://
www.lalecheleague.org/LawMain.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2000).
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texts of custody and visitation, public breastfeeding, employment,
and whether breastfeeding is grounds for exemption from jury
duty.' 3
The role of breastfeeding in the criminal law had received atten-
tion from the legal community in recent years only in the context
of "extended" breastfeeding as a possible form of abuse.'a How-
ever, those cases have not resulted in findings of abuse or neglect. 15
Before the case of Tabitha Walrond, inadequate breastfeeding had
never been found to be the sole cause of abuse and neglect except
in situations where mothers used controlled substances while
breastfeeding. 16 For example, in California, two mothers were
prosecuted when their babies died with amphetamines in their sys-
tems-the drugs having been transmitted through breastmilk.17
Although evidence did not show exposure to amphetamines to be
the cause of either death, both mothers were found guilty of child
endangerment.18 Critics of these cases cite them as part of the "le-
gal trend to punish mothers with substance abuse problems rather
than get them the help they need while pregnant or after they give
birth."' 9
The recent trend toward treating breastfeeding as an issue in the
criminal law stems from the vast amount of research in support of
the health benefits associated with breastfeeding. The United
States government, the United Nations, and the World Health Or-
ganization all have recognized the benefits of breastfeeding.2 °
13. Id.
14. ELIZABETH BALDWIN, EXTENDED BREASTFEEDING AND THE LAW, at http://
www.lalecheleague.org/LawExtended.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2000). This issue ex-
ists when social service agencies determine mothers who breastfeed their children up
to six, seven, or eight years of age abusive. Id.
15. Id.
16. Corey Silberstein Shdaimah, Why Breastfeeding is (Also) A Legal Issue, 10
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 409, 427-28 (1999).
17. ELIZABETH N. BALDWIN, A BRIEF SUMMARY OF BREASTFEEDING AND THE
LAW, at http://www. lalecheleague.org/LawBF.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2000).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Shdaimah, supra note 16, at 430-37. In the 1970s Congress developed the Spe-
cial Supplemental Nutrition Program for Woman, Infants, and Children (WIC). Id.
This program allocates federal funds to the states to be used for supplemental nutri-
tion for children under the age of five, pregnant women postpartum who breastfeed
for one year, and postpartum mothers who do not breastfeed for up to six months. Id.
The World Health Organization has adopted a number of resolutions that declare
breastfeeding as the optimal and exclusive source of infant nutrition throughout the
first six weeks of life. Id. In 1989, the United Nations General Assembly recognized
the health advantages to breastfeeding when it adopted The Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Id.
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Breastfeeding has been shown to benefit babies, mothers, fathers,
and society in general.21 According to the American Academy of
Pediatrics, "Extensive research, especially in recent years, docu-
ments diverse and compelling advantages to infants, mothers, fami-
lies, and society from breastfeeding and the use of human milk for
infant feeding. These include health, nutritional, immunologic, de-
velopmental, psychological, social, economic, and environmental
benefits. ' 22 Research has shown that babies who are breastfed
have "better immune protection, better neurological development,
higher IWs and decreased incidence in Sudden Infant Death Syn-
drome, intestinal disorders (pediatric and adult), juvenile diabetes,
childhood cancers, and allergies. 23
Breastfeeding benefits women in that it is associated with a re-
duced incidence of breast cancer, osteoporosis, diabetes, and
delayed return to fertility.24 These medical benefits result in a re-
duction of medical expenses and employee absenteeism.2 5 Fathers
also benefit due to the breastfeeding of their children by paying
lower medical costs, knowing that their infants will "receive the
best start in life intellectually, socially, and emotionally," and from
the strong bonds infants learn to develop through breastfeeding z6
Aside from the medical research recognizing benefits of
breastfeeding, courts and legislatures have recognized the choice to
breastfeed as an extension of the choice to have children. 27 The
New York legislature has recognized the right of a mother to
breastfeed as a civil right, in that it is "the most basic act of nurture
between mother and baby. '28
In Board of Directors v. Rossetti,2 9 the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania became one of the first courts to address the issue of a
woman's right to breastfeed. Although this case concerned the de-
21. Kristen D. Hofheimer, Breastfeeding as a Factor in Child Custody and Visita-
tion Decisions, 5 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 433, 435-47 (1998). By extension, even soci-
ety reaps the benefits of breastfeeding through reduced medical costs associated by
the reduced health risks of babies who are breastfed. Id. at 447.
22. Shdaimah, supra note 16, at 22 n.4.
23. Id. at 409 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 411.
25. Id.
26. Hofheimer, supra note 21, at 446-47.
27. E.g., Dike v. United States, 650 F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that
breastfeeding is a right inherent in parental care). But see Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d
1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments deserve
strict protection free from undue interference).
28. N.Y. Civ. RiGwrs LAw § 79(e) (McKinney 1999).
29. Rossetti, 411 A.2d 486, 488-89 (Pa. 1979) (upholding the school board's denial
of discretionary leave to a teacher who chose to breastfeed her allergy prone child).
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nial of a mother's right to breastfeed her child during the workday,
it is significant because it brought this inherently female issue to
the forefront of discussion. The court explained that a similarly
situated male teacher would have received the same treatment by
the school.30 However, as noted in the dissent, "[Tihe majority
contends that appellee has been treated no differently than any
male teacher... [t]his position ignores the obvious reality that only
women can perform the breastfeeding function . . . [and] is dis-
criminat[ory] on the basis of sex."31
Dike v. School Board32 also recognized a woman's right to
breastfeed. The Dike court found breastfeeding to be protected
under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution.33
Breastfeeding is the most elemental form of parental care. It is
communion between mother and child that, like marriage, is 'in-
timate to the degree of being sacred' .... In light of the spec-
trum of interests that the Supreme Court has held specially
protected we conclude that the constitution protects from exces-
sive state interference a woman's decision respecting breastfeed-
ing her child.34
Thus, under the Dike court's reasoning, the mother has a constitu-
tional right to breastfeed free from undue state interference; how-
ever, this unique right imposes unique duties. Generally, the
breastfeeding mother is the exclusive provider of nourishment to
her child. Additionally, medical research shows that breastfeeding
hormonally links mother to child. 5 Research has demonstrated
that "[a] breastfeeding mother ... has a biologically programmed
advantage over a bottlefeeding mother or caregiver with regard to
responsiveness to attachment behaviors. "36 Such research con-
30. Id. at 489.
31. Id. at 489-90 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted).
32. Dike, 650 F.2d at 785.
33. Dike, 650 F.2d at 786-87. Although Shahar later overruled the Dike Court's
application of a strict scrutiny standard to family choices in the employment context
in the 11th Circuit, the court discusses in depth the choice to breastfeed. Id. Shahar
did not deal specifically with the issue of breastfeeding, but it dealt with the same
amendments as Dike. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997); see also
Shdaimah, supra note 16, at 420 (discussing the Dike analysis).
34. Shdaimah, supra note 16, at 420 (citation omitted).
35. Hofheimer, supra note 21, at 440 ("Research on hormones released during
lactation reveals an intricate 'mother-infant physiologic interdependency' that rein-
forces maternal care for infants and children ... hormones released during lactation
enhance mothering behavior and reinforce bonding between mother and child.").
36. Id. at 445.
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tends that breastfeeding mothers are more responsive than bottle
feeding mothers to satiety cues.37
B. In Utero Drug Exposure
Another example of an inherently female child abuse offense is
drug addicted pregnancy. The prosecution of mothers who were
addicted to illegal drugs during pregnancy emerged during the late
1980s and early 1990s. 38 In 1989, Florida became the first state to
prosecute a mother for exposing her child to drugs in utero.39 Jen-
nifer Johnson was arrested and convicted pursuant to a Florida
statute that made delivery of drugs to a minor illegal.40 The prose-
cution argued that during the seconds immediately following the
birth, but before the umbilical cord was cut, drugs passed from
mother to child via the cord.4' Ms. Johnson was sentenced to a
fifteen-year counseling program that included probation, drug re-
habilitation, educational requirements, and mandatory prenatal
care if she were ever to become pregnant again.42
The prosecution of a woman for her behavior during pregnancy
is controversial because such action places the woman's rights in
opposition to, and often secondary to, those of the fetus. 43 Fur-
thermore, the statutory authority of these prosecutions is question-
able because these cases often are prosecuted under state laws
drafted to protect children rather than fetuses.4' From the 1973
decision Roe v. Wade45 to the present, no court has granted to a
fetus throughout all stages of the pregnancy, the same Fourteenth
Amendment rights as a person.
The Supreme Court attempted to balance the interests of the fe-
tus and the mother in both Roe v. Wade46 and Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.47 Although both decisions
37. Id. at 446.
38. Moss, supra note 7, at 278.
39. Id. at 280.
40. Moss, supra note 7, at 280; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13 (West 2000) ("[I]t is
unlawful for any person 18 years of age or older to deliver any controlled substance to
a person under the age of 18 years.").
41. Moss, supra note 7, at 280-81.
42. Id.
43. See generally Lorraine Schmall, Addicted Pregnancy as a Sex Crime, 13 N. ILL.
U. L. REv. 263 (1993) (discussing the legal implications of drug use during
pregnancy).
44. See Moss, supra note 7, at 285.
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
46. Id. at 150.
47. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
20011
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focus upon a woman's'right to an abortion, they are relevant to the
issue of in utero drug exposure because of their detailed discus-
sions of the rights of the mother in relation to the fetus and the
issue of viability.48
In both decisions, the Court tried to define when the interest of
the fetus, or potential life, superseded that of the mother suffi-
ciently to justify state involvement in the pregnancy. The Court in
Roe v. Wade recognized, as applied to abortion:
[A] legitimate state interest.. . need not stand or fall on accept-
ance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some other
point prior to live birth ... as long as at least potential life is
involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection of
the pregnant woman alone.4 9
That state interest becomes one of "protecting prenatal life."'50
In abortion decisions, the issue of when a fetus can be legally
aborted and when the state can prevent termination of the preg-
nancy is an issue of viability. A fetus is considered viable when
there is a realistic possibility of its maintaining independent exis-
tence outside the womb.5 '
Viability does not aid the analysis of in utero drug exposure
cases because it is not as easy to determine the boundaries of via-
bility when the issue is harm inflicted on the fetus rather than a
termination of the pregnancy.5 2 When a baby is born with compli-
cations from drug exposure, it is difficult to ascertain when this ex-
posure occurred.53 In addition, the harm incurred by the baby does
not necessarily occur after viability, but rather whenever the baby
is exposed to drugs during the pregnancy. Therefore, from the mo-
ment of conception, the state's interest in the potential life places
the rights of the fetus in opposition to those of the mother.54
48. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150-51; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (stating that viability is
the point of fetal development where the fetus may exist apart from the womb, and
that, for this reason, a woman's right to terminate the pregnancy may be restricted
after viability).
49. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150-51.
50. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150-51; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (asserting that "[t]he
state has a legitimate interest in promoting the life of the unborn").
51. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
52. Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the
Problems of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 529-30 (1992).
53. See, e.g., Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., 874 F. Supp. 1441 (D. V.I. 1994)
(discussing the difficulty in determining precisely when and how harm from in utero
drug exposure occurred).
54. Id.
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Fetal rights in situations of in utero drug exposure can be distin-
guished from those in cases of abortion. Because the right to use
illegal substances is not a compelling interest, it is difficult to justify
drug use as protected activity under the same rationales as a wo-
man's right to have an abortion. Therefore, at no time during the
pregnancy does the mother have the legal right to put her child at
risk by using illegal drugs. Indeed, some state statutes criminalize
mothers exposing their babies to alcohol in utero.56 Though using
alcohol is not a compelling right, it is not illegal to do so, and yet,
these statutes regulate a woman's legal activity during every stage
of her pregnancy. 7
Another constitutional issue arising from prosecuting mothers
with drug addictions is that in these cases women are prosecuted
for the condition of being pregnant and being addicted to drugs,
rather than the discrete act of taking a drug. This violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because both preg-
nancy and addiction are conditions, and not independent illegal
acts. 8
According to the current system in several states, mothers are
prosecuted when a baby is born with effects of drug exposure that
could have occurred anytime during the pregnancy.59 Often this
determination of exposure and effects is based upon a drug test
performed on either the mother or baby just after birth.60 This is
particularly controversial because it requires medical professionals
to perform drug tests of their patients, and, subsequently, to report
the results to law enforcement authorities. This raises issues of se-
lective enforcement and doctor-patient confidentiality and is cur-
rently under scrutiny by the Supreme Court.6'
States take varying approaches to prosecuting such cases, in
terms of both the windows of time they use for prosecution (for the
55. Caroline S. Palmer, The Risks of State Intervention in Preventing Prenatal Al-
cohol Abuse and the Viability of an Inclusive Approach: Arguments for Limiting Puni-
tive and Coercive Prenatal Alcohol Abuse Legislation in Minnesota, 10 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 287, 309 (1999) (arguing that "[t]here is no fundamental right to use
alcohol or drugs during pregnancy; these actions endanger both the fetus and the
mother and implicate the state's interest in protecting both").
56. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (1983).
57. Id.
58. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (striking down California statute
which made it a criminal offense to be addicted to illegal narcotics).
59. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-8-104 (1984).
60. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (1983).
61. Gaylord Shaw, High Court Reviews Drug Tests, NEWSDAY, Oct. 5, 2000, at
A23.
2001]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
presence of drugs before or after birth), and to the theories under
which they prosecute. Rather than simply testing for drugs in the
baby's system at birth, some state statutes extend the window for
prosecution to when the baby shows effects of drug exposure fol-
lowing birth. These windows can range from one week after birth
until one year after birth.62 Generally, courts feel safer ruling on
the harm in utero drugs will likely cause the child, than on the
harm already inflicted upon the fetus.63 Recently, the Ohio Su-
preme Court found a woman whose child was injured in utero by
drugs liable for the injury, not because the fetus had rights in utero,
but because of the potential harm likely to be incurred by the child
later.64 Indeed, children exposed to drugs in utero often exhibit
physical, intellectual, and social developmental deficits throughout
their lives; they also face the day to day dangers of living with a
drug addicted parent.65
Opponents of the decisions in these cases argue that testing posi-
tive for drugs once during pregnancy should not determine a wo-
man's fitness as a parent.66 Additionally, they criticize states using
a finding of in utero drug exposure as a presumption of neglect. 67
In Department of Social Services v. Felicia B.,68 the New York
Court of Appeals found a mother's past drug use an indicator of
present harm to the newborn. This is particularly problematic be-
cause it assumes that only a mother may inflict the harm of neglect
and abuse.69
Although many disagree with finding mothers liable for drug use
while pregnant, research indicates that in most situations a fetus
exposed to drugs in utero suffers irreparable harm.70 The harm to
the fetus that results from drug use during pregnancy is substan-
62. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556 (1983) (extending the window of prose-
cution to whether the baby shows signs of exposure during the first year of life), with
VA. STAT. ANN. § 63.1-248.3 (1975) (extending the window of prosecution to whether
the baby shows signs of exposure during the first seven days of life).
63. Louise Marlane Chan, S.O.S. From the Womb: A Call for New York Legisla-
tion Criminalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199, 210-211
(1993).
64. In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 736 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio 2000).
65. E.g., WESTMAN, supra note 6, at 76-77.
66. See Oberman, supra note 52, at 521, 538.
67. Id. at 539.
68. 543 N.Y.S.2d 637 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1989).
69. See Oberman, supra note 52, at 538.
70. E.g., L.S. Prichep et al., Quantitative EEG Characteristics of Children Exposed
In Utero to Cocaine, 1995 ELSEVIER SCIENCE B.V. 166 (1995) (discussing a study re-
vealing significant brain dysfunction in school age children who were exposed to crack
cocaine in utero).
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tial.71 Annually, more than four percent of babies born in the
United States have been exposed to drugs in utero.72 Exposure to
drugs like crack cocaine in utero often results in physical problems
including "brain damage, seizures, malformations, and respiratory
and neurological abnormalities. ' '73 In addition, children exposed to
drugs in utero experience psychological and behavioral conditions
including hyperactivity, hypersensitivity to touch, and concentra-
tion and learning problems.74 Supporters of prosecution for these
cases agree that although only females may be prosecuted, this is
not discriminatory because females are the sole perpetrators of this
crime.75
C. Possible Liability for HIV Transmission
In 1992, the Centers for Disease Control estimated that there
were 10,000 children infected with Human Immunodeficiency Vi-
rus (HIV) in the United States.76 Mothers who are pregnant and
have HIV are at significant risk for passing the virus to their chil-
dren during pregnancy or delivery, or after delivery through
breastfeeding. 77 There is an estimated thirty percent to fifty per-
cent likelihood that a mother with HIV will pass it along to her
child.78
The effect of laws criminalizing mother to fetus transmission of
HIV is a hotly debated topic. 79 Although most state statutes do
not explicitly address exposure or transmission from mother to
child, several have enacted legislation to criminalize the choice of
an HIV-infected woman to have a child.8 0 Rather than explicit
71. Id.
72. WESTMAN, supra note 6, at 76.
73. Chan, supra note 63, at 201.
74. WESTMAN, supra note 6, at 77.
75. WESTMAN, supra note 6, at 76-77 (discussing the effects of substance abuse on
child development).
76. Id. at 77.
77. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 83.2 (McKinney 1999) ("The term significant
risk of transmitting or contracting HIV infection includes.., the gestation, birthing or
breast feeding of an infant when the mother is infected with HIV.").
78. Michael L. Closen et al., Criminalization of an Epidemic: HIV-AIDS and
Criminal Exposure Laws, 46 ARK. L. REV. 921, 961 (1994).
79. See, e.g., Closen, supra note 78, at 921; Mary Anne Bobinski, Women and HIV:
A Gender-Based Analysis of a Disease and its Legal Regulation, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 7 (1994).
80. But see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (1987); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 112-
16.2 (West 1993) Ch. 38 12-16.2; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (1997); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 191.677(1)(2) (2000). One example of extremely vague language in a state
statute dealing with criminal exposure laws is Georgia statute § 17-10-15. "Significant
exposure" is defined as:
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criminalization of in utero HIV exposure, most statutes use vague
language from which mother-to-child transmission can be included
as violative of the statute.81 Only one state expressly prohibits the
prosecution of HIV transmission from mother to child. 82 This is
particularly noteworthy because the choice to procreate has been
determined by the Supreme Court to be a fundamental right.83
Most statutes that criminalize HIV exposure have intent require-
ments.84 Therefore, to convict mothers whose exposure to HIV of
their children results in transmission, a prosecutor would have to
prove that the intent of a woman's pregnancy was to cause death or
serious bodily injury to her offspring. While this intent is difficult
to prove, the analysis is altered as scientific progress allows for
mothers with HIV to seek medical care, thus reducing the chance
of transmission. 5
Breakthroughs in prenatal care have prevented some transmis-
sions, 86 and the number of women receiving late or no prenatal
care has declined.87 Nevertheless, the same groups at greatest risk
for HIV infection-minorities, the urban poor, and drug users-
contact of the victim's ruptured or broken skin or mucous membranes with
the blood or body fluids of the person arrested for such offense other than
tears, saliva, or perspiration, of a magnitude that the Centers for Disease
Control have epidemiologically demonstrated can result in transmission of
human immunodeficiency virus.
GA. STAT. § 17-10-15 (1997).
81. Closen, supra note 78, at 947.
82. OKLA. STAT. ANN. 21 § 1192.1 (2001).
It shall be unlawful for any person knowing that he or she has Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or is a carrier of the human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV) and with intent to infect another, to engage in con-
duct reasonably likely to result in the transfer of the person's own blood,
bodily fluids containing visible blood, semen, or vaginal secretions into the
bloodstream of another, or through the skin or other membranes of another
person, except during in utero transmission of blood or bodily fluids.
Id.
83. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992).
84. See generally Closen, supra note 78, at 924-34 (discussing intent requirements
of criminal transmission laws).
85. Lynne M. Mofenson, Can Perinatal HIV Infection be Eliminated in the United
States? 282 JAMA 6, 577 (1999) available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v282n6/
full /jed90057.html. There are antiretroviral drugs that work to prevent the virus from
reproducing and may help protect the fetus from contracting HIV from the infected
mother. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. ("While adolescent pregnancies have declined since 1991, there continue to
be high pregnancy rates among minority adolescent women, the women most likely to
be at risk of HIV infection.").
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88are least likely to receive prenatal care. Fourteen percent of
HIV-infected women giving birth did not receive prenatal care and
twenty-three percent started care only during the third trimester of
pregnancy. 89 Now that preventative measures exist, the question
becomes whether women who fail to take these measures and re-
ceive adequate prenatal care could or should be found to have
demonstrated a critical element of this crime-the intent to cause
death or serious bodily harm-hence, should be prosecuted. As
the probability of preventing transmission improves with adequate
health care, prosecutors may be able to infer intent-or minimally,
negligence-from a failure to get proper prenatal care.
D. A Mother's Duty to Her Fetus in Tort Law
Although this issue is receiving more attention because of the
growing prevalence of drug addiction and HIV, prosecuting a
mother for harming her child before birth is not new. In the past
century, courts addressed a mother's duty to her fetus in a number
of scenarios. However, these decisions have been inconsistent on
the balancing of the rights of the mother with the rights of the fetus
in the tort law context. 9° No steadfast rules exist regarding this
legal issue. 91
In Staliman v. Youngquist,92 the Illinois Supreme Court discussed
at length its refusal to bring an action against a mother on behalf of
a fetus. In Stallman, an infant brought an action against its mother
for prenatal injuries sustained in an automobile accident.93 The
court did not recognize a cause of action brought by the fetus, sub-
sequently born alive, against its mother for the unintentional inflic-
tion of prenatal injuries. 94 Although the court validated the right of
the fetus to begin life with "a sound mind and body," it argued that
asserting this right against the mother would have serious ramifica-
tions for women, families, and society.95 The Stallman court con-
cluded that a legal division of maternal and fetal rights could
potentially jeopardize reproductive freedom.96
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Schmall, supra note 43, at 276 ("A fetus can sue in tort or be murdered by a
third person-sometimes.")
91. Id.
92. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d 355 (I11. 1988).
93. Id. at 355.
94. Id. at 361.
95. Id. at 359.
96. Id. at 359-61.
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In Stallman, the court criticized previous cases holding a child's
mother to the same standard of liability for negligent conduct re-
sulting in prenatal injury as that to which a third person would be
held. One such case, Grodin v. Grodin,97 arose after a mother took
tetracyclene while pregnant, thus harming her fetus in utero.
Grodin has been criticized for "hav[ing] ... the law treat a preg-
nant woman as a stranger to her developing fetus for the purposes
of tort liability."98 The Stallman court criticized a position that
would expose a woman to heightened liability simply for becoming
pregnant, differentiating between the position of a third party
tortfeasor, and a pregnant mother. It stated:
Holding a third person liable for prenatal injuries furthers the
interests of both the mother and the subsequently born child
and does not interfere with the defendant's right to control his
or her own life. Holding a mother liable for the unintentional
infliction of prenatal injuries subjects to State scrutiny all the
decisions a woman must make in attempting to carry a preg-
nancy to term, and infringes on her right to privacy and bodily
autonomy.99
Exposing a woman to criminal or civil penalties would have seri-
ous ramifications, hence forcing her to subordinate her right to
control her life when she becomes pregnant. The fetus and the
mother would be forced into a status of legal adversaries unlike
any traditional plaintiff and defendant relationship. Feminist criti-
cism of such liability finds it a strain upon "our concepts of per-
sonal integrity to consider a woman as of no greater importance
than as a fetal environment.' ' 100
Proponents of the prosecution of mothers for behavior that af-
fects the fetus in utero argue that maternal liability is no different
than third party liability, and even more desirable because the
mother is in such a controlling position, in terms of the health of
the fetus. 10 ' These people cite strong opposition to these cases as a
form of "juvenile ageism."'1 2 In his book, Licensing Parents, psy-
97. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
98. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
99. Id.
100. Schmall, supra note 43, at 273.
101. See generally Nova D. Janssen, Fetal Rights and the Prosecution of Women for
Using Drugs During Pregnancy, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 741 (2000) (asserting that the
government has the power to prevent pregnant mothers from using drugs through
stricter criminal liability for these offenses).
102. See generally WESTMAN, supra note 6, at 123-48 (discussing the dynamics and
forms of juvenile ageism).
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chologist Jack Westman explains that the lack of parental account-
ability in the United States exists because of discrimination similar
to racism and sexism.10 3 This is because of children's lack of social,
financial, and political power. He writes:
[T]he fact that unborn children need protection against the dan-
gerous actions of their pregnant mothers is receiving increasing
attention. The height of parental incompetence is seen when
mothers damage their unborn babies by knowingly ingesting
toxic substances during pregnancy and then neglecting their in-
fants after childbirth with resulting additional physical and de-
velopmental damage. 04
This view supports maternal-fetus liability beyond that of third
party tortfeasors.
H. THE GENDER CONFLICT
Perhaps the most striking facet of prosecuting mothers who
harm their children in utero, or shortly after birth (as in cases of
neglect involved with breastfeeding), is the disparity it creates in
the treatment of men and women under the law. Because these
cases can have only female defendants the question whether they
are applied discriminatorily is moot-they can only be applied dis-
criminatorily. This part of the Comment addresses controversies
surrounding the scenarios presented in Part I, and explores possi-
ble male analogs. This section concludes with a comparison of
male and female offenders, and their treatment in the criminal jus-
tice system.
A. The Practical Effect of Child Abuse Laws Applied
to Women
1. Breastfeeding
In prosecuting mothers for activity directly involved with
breastfeeding, society runs the risk of deterring women from
breastfeeding. This is of particular concern given that breastfeed-
ing rates are already steadily declining. 0 5 Prosecutors must strike
a balance between encouraging breastfeeding and prosecuting
mothers who do so improperly.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 76.
105. Shdaimain, supra note 16, at 442 (citing a study on patterns of breastfeeding by
the World Health Organization).
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If breastfeeding mothers are more sensitive to their child's
needs,10 6 the question becomes whether it is even a plausible argu-
ment that Tabitha Walrond did not realize her child was starving to
death. According to this argument, Tabitha Walrond should have
been hormonally programmed to identify her baby's malnutrition
better than an ordinary observer, or even a non-breastfeeding
mother. She was in the best position to identify and rectify the
problem. Therefore, her prosecution for her son's death was the
most effective way to deal with the situation.
Nevertheless, her failure to breastfeed adequately does not nec-
essarily render her negligent under judicial standards of reasona-
bleness as a reasonable person or a reasonable mother, but more
specifically as a reasonable breastfeeding mother. Such a detail-
specific inquiry as that of the reasonable breastfeeding mother
would ultimately impose a greater duty upon mothers who choose
to breastfeed than their bottlefeeding counterparts.
This argument suggests a stricter standard of care be imposed on
mothers because of their unique biological relationship to the
child. It follows that Tabitha Walrond, and women like her,
whether or not intending to harm their children, fail, not simply as
reasonable people, but also as nurturing mothers.
2. Drug Abuse
Approaching the epidemic of in utero drug exposure as a legal
issue rather than a medical issue may hinder rather than aid pre-
vention.10 7 If the goal of laws directed at this issue is deterrence,
prosecution of mothers for past harm to the fetus may not be the
most effective vehicle. Prosecution deters mothers from seeking
the appropriate healthcare because they run the risk of having
their medical records turned over to prosecutors. 10 8 A study pub-
lished in the Journal of the American Medical Association found
states that approach drug use as a legal rather than health concern
were the same states that offered limited resources for substance
abuse treatment.10 9
Further complicating this scenario is the fact that it is extremely
difficult for pregnant women to receive appropriate drug rehabili-
106. Supra Part I.A.
107. Mofenson, supra note 86, at 578 (noting that criminalizing pregnant drug use
may actually deter women from seeking prenatal care).
108. See generally Oberman, supra note 52, at 520-21 (discussing the ramifications
of child abuse and neglect laws on pregnant drug users).
109. Mofenson, supra note 86, at 577.
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tation during pregnancy. 110 Waiting lists for drug treatment facili-
ties prevent pregnant women from accessing the medical care they
need immediately."' Also, many facilities refuse to accept preg-
nant addicts because it is not cost effective and creates increased
liability due to the complications of prenatal care." 2
Therefore, in most jurisdictions that criminalize in utero drug ex-
posure, no help is available for the pregnant woman. She is left
with two choices: obtain medical care at the risk of having a physi-
cian report her drug use to the state and face possible prosecu-
tion," 3 or receive no drug treatment or prenatal care and subject
her baby to the risk of serious defects.
3. HIV Transmission
"Although the transmission of HIV from woman to child is
unique, some of the behaviors which create the risk of HIV trans-
mission from woman to child are engaged in by either gender." 114
For example, a pregnant woman who has sex with an HIV-infected
man puts her fetus at risk of exposure. But that HIV-infected man
is also putting the fetus at risk. However, due to the ambiguity of
the intent requirements in laws that criminalize transmission, only
a woman who does not know she is infected when she gets preg-
nant, or does not realize she is pregnant and thus does not take
proper medical precautions to decrease the risk of transmission,
could be prosecuted simply for giving birth." 5
The complexity of the problem, particularly the intent require-
ments (in light of medical advances), the constitutional issues re-
garding procreative freedom, and the economic and social
problems caused by the disease render an appropriate balance
within the law difficult to achieve. Regulation of behaviors that
present a risk of HIV transmission benefits women, but regulation
through the criminal law or tort systems constitutes yet another
110. See Moss, supra note 7, at 297 (noting examples of hospitals refusing to treat
pregnant drug addicts).
111. Chan, supra note 63, at 208-09.
112. Oberman, supra note 52, at 515-16. Statistics reflect the significant difficulty
for pregnant women face in accessing adequate drug treatment. Id. at 516.
113. Id. at 520. This could result in possible jail time for the remainder of the preg-
nancy, thus exposing the baby to further risks. Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of the
Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, The Practice of
Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of the Law, 53 OHIo ST. L.J.
1205, 1250 (1992).
114. Bobinski, supra note 79, at 34.
115. Id.
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example of punishing the mother who fails to fit the mold of nur-
turing mother.
B. Inherently Male Offenses-Is There Such a Thing?
Because of the unique physical relationship of a woman to her
baby, most comparisons of cases involving in utero drug exposure
or failure to adequately breastfeed to cases that only have male
defendants-"inherently male" cases-falls short. This section
analyzes situations where the father's relation to the child is most
similar to that of the mother in the line of "inherently female"
cases, and examines how the law treats these cases. Three such sce-
narios are drug use by men that affects sperm, domestic abuse, and
custody of fertilized eggs for in vitro fertilization after a divorce
proceeding. The law treats these cases by either recognizing male
procreative rights or increasing maternal duties.
1. Drug Use
Drug use by men adversely affects sperm.1 6 Although studies
have shown drug use by men affects reproduction, "[m]en are not,
and most likely will never be, arrested for child abuse after having
used morphine or methadone, substances which animal studies
have revealed will affect sperm." 1 7 Under the law, the man and
the child are treated as distinct and separate entities from the time
of conception, and are therefore not placed in the same legal con-
flict as the mother and the fetus." 8
Additionally, some states hold drug use by pregnant women to
be a presumptive finding that the child will be neglected after
birth.119 No such presumption is employed with regard to the fa-
ther.1 20 Therefore, what appears to be a similar situation is in fact
treated differently in the judicial system.
2. Domestic Violence
Domestic violence is both a family issue and a gender issue. Al-
though domestic violence can be perpetrated by either gender,
"[t]here is no known human society in which the level of lethal
116. Moss, supra note 7, at 286.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 291-92.
120. E.g., Schmall, supra note 43, at 285. "Men are not arrested for child abuse or
prosecuted for neglect after having used illegal drugs which are known to adversely
affect sperm." Id.
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violence among women even begins to approach that among
men."'121 Male violence, both within the family unit and in society
as a whole, greatly surpasses that of female violence. 122 In situa-
tions of violence between intimates, the male is commonly the per-
petrator, and the female the victim. However, child abuse is
traditionally regarded as a female crime. 23 This perception of the
male as the perpetrator of domestic violence, and the female as the
perpetrator of child abuse ignores any correlation between domes-
tic violence and child abuse. 24
The perception of child abuse as a predominantly female crime is
inaccurate. Research indicates that fathers may be as likely or
more likely than mothers to abuse their children. 125 Furthermore,
men's abuse of children often results in more serious injuries to
children.126 This misperception of the problem results in an overall
failure to adequately address child abuse by men. 27
Recently, scholars have taken notice of the absence of men from
the traditional analysis of child abuse. Scholars attribute this "male
invisibility" to the lack of research on the subject of male child
abuse and the failure of support programs for abusive parents to
focus on both parents, rather than simply on mother-child
bonding.128
Although this issue is receiving more scholarly attention, the ju-
dicial system has thus far failed to address the new findings. This is
evidenced by "failure to protect statutes" that prosecute the pas-
sive partner (most often the female partner) in a domestic violence
situation. 129
121. CORAMAE RICHIE MANN, WHEN WOMEN KILL 2 (1996) (citing M. DALY & M.
WILSON, HOMICIDE 146 (1988)).
122. Id.
123. Michelle S. Jacobs, Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for
Mothers Under Failure to Protect Statutes, 88 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 593-94
(1998).
124. Maureen Halpern, Is a Battered Mother who Does Not Leave the Abusive Re-
lationship a Neglectful Parent?, INTERDISCIPLINARY REPORT ON AT-RISK CHILDREN
& FAMILIES, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 83 (discussing evidence that overwhelmingly shows the
link between domestic violence and child abuse) (citations omitted).
125. Ashe, supra note 10, at 87-88.
126. Id.
127. Jacobs, supra note 123, at 594; The "Failure to Protect" Working Group,
Charging Battered Mothers with "Failure to Protect": Still Blaming the Victim, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849 (2000) (discussing the current status of "failure to protect"
statutes).
128. Id. at 594-95.
129. Id. at 595.
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Both parents have an affirmative duty to their children. 3 '
Therefore, when parents fail in this duty, the law can hold them
criminally liable.1 3 ' Although this duty runs to both parents,
mothers are more likely than men to be held liable when the child's
needs are not met.132 In cases where a male intimate of a mother
(whether the father of the child or not) abuses a child, the mother
can be held liable based on her failure to protect the child from
abuse. 33 However, when the gender roles are reversed, the father
is rarely held liable for a similar omission. 34
Society is particularly unwilling to excuse a mother who "allows"
her child to be abused, even if the mother is a victim of battering
herself.'35 Often, she lacks the financial or emotional resources
necessary to leave an abusive situation.136 However, "[c]ourts have
been reluctant to excuse the mother's failure to save the child from
abuse on the grounds that she herself has been abused."' 37 Courts
interpret failure to protect laws as strict liability laws, so regardless
of how badly battered physically or emotionally a mother is, she
has an affirmative duty to protect her child from her abuser. 38
Further, failure to protect laws, although written in gender neutral
terms, are applied overwhelmingly to women.139 "Courts hold
130. Id. at 587 ("Both parents have a duty to clothe and feed their children and
maintain basic necessities. The parental duty to the child is at least, theoretically, not
without limit.").
131. Id.
132. Roberts, supra note 8, at 96.
133. See generally Somini Sengupta, Tough Justice: Taking a Child When One Par-
ent is Battered, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2000, at Al (discussing situations where a mother
is charged with child neglect when her male intimate abuses her child); see also Ja-
cobs, supra note 123, at 621-45 (discussing evolution and rationale behind punishing
omissions by the non-aggressive party from removing the child from the abusive envi-
ronment); The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 127, at 854 (asserting
that the current standard for making a neglect finding based upon a parent's failure
"to exercise a minimum degree of care and that failure results or will result in physi-
cal, emotional or psychological impairments to the child" is actually applied as a strict
liability statute).
134, Jacobs, supra note 123, at 583-84 (comparing the case of Pauline Zile, a woman
convicted for first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison when her child died
at the hands of her husband, with the case of a man whose wife murdered his child
who not only was found to have no duty to protect, but was met with a sympathetic
reaction from the public).
135. Id. at 583.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 585.
138. E.g., N.Y. FAM. COURT Acr § 1012 (McKinney 1998); In the Matter of Glenn
G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992); The "Failure to Protect" Working Group,
supra note 127, at 854.
139. Jacobs, supra note 123, at 618.
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mothers responsible for violence in the family. Society considers
child abuse a failure of a mother's natural capacity to nurture and
protect.'140 The biased application of failure to protect statutes
perpetuate the myth that child abuse cases, even when the perpe-
trator is male, are ultimately the fault of the female.
These cases emphasize the exaggerated duties of mothers and
perpetuate the acceptability of the detachment of fathers from
their offspring. In theory, cases of child abuse by males could be
compared with inherently female abuse cases like in utero drug or
alcohol exposure because in both cases, a parent is acting affirma-
tively to harm his or her child. Arguably, in cases of physical child
abuse there is a more direct causal link because the harm is visible
immediately. Unlike drug abuse, physical abuse is not based in ad-
diction. When someone strikes a child, the damage, whether it be
bleeding or simply the child crying out, is immediate. However,
damage done to a child in utero is seen months and sometimes
years after the harmful behavior occurred. Also, in physical child
abuse the physical harm runs only to the child, whereas in in utero
drug exposure, the mother is inflicting harm on herself as well as
her child.
However, the analogy falls short because these cases merely re-
sult in an extension of duties assigned to the mother. The passive
father who allows his female partner to use crack, or even provides
her with the drug, is not prosecuted under negligence or failure to
protect statutes, whereas a mother who is battered and tormented
by her abuser is subsequently held liable for his action.
3. In Vitro Fertilization
Arguably, a woman has greater duty to her children because she
has more rights than her male counterpart. 4' This argument is
most often seen in custody cases, where the "best interest of the
child" standard is often interpreted to mean "in the custody of its
mother.' 42 However, the rights of the father in custody cases are
expanding. One such example is the question of who retains cus-
tody of the fetus for in vitro fertilization after a man and woman
separate. For example, Davis v. Davis dealt with the ownership
rights of fertilized embryos after a divorce proceeding. 43 In this
case, Mrs. Davis wanted the frozen embryos donated to another
140. Roberts, supra note 8, at 110-11.
141. See id. at 96-98, 98 n.17.
142. Id.
143. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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couple, while Mr. Davis wanted them destroyed.144 The court
weighed the interest of both parties, and rejected the idea that a
female has a greater interest and therefore should be vested with
control of the frozen embryos.145 The court attempted a gender-
neutral analysis, finding the male and female interest in the frozen
embryos equal.146 The court said:
None of the concerns about a woman's bodily integrity that
have previously precluded men from controlling abortion deci-
sions is applicable here. We are not unmindful of the fact that
the trauma (including both the emotional stress and physical dis-
comfort) to which women are subjected in the IVF process is
more severe than is the impact of the procedure on men. In this
sense, it is fair to say that women contribute more to the IVF
process than men. Their experience, however, must be viewed
in light of the joys of parenthood that is desired or the relative
anguish of a lifetime of unwanted parenthood. As they stand on
the brink of potential parenthood, Mary Sue Davis and Junior
Lewis David must be seen as entirely equal gamete-providers. 4 7
In recognizing the equality of both partners in the decision to
become parents, the court upheld Junior Lewis Davis' rights. 48
Here, a court used the application of a gender-neutral standard to
advance the interest of the male partner.
The treatment of male drug use, domestic abuse, and custody
cases exemplifies the difference in the perception of motherhood
and fatherhood. Interestingly, these cases most resemble the in-
herently female line of cases when the father's rights in the child
are at issue, rather than his duties to the child. As was the scenario
in Davis, the court applied a gender-neutral standard to recognize
the rights of the father.149 Similarly, when imposing an affirmative
duty on a parent, although the statutes are written using the pro-
noun "he" as a neutral term for any "parent, guardian or other
144. Id. at 590.
145. Id. at 590-91 (rejecting the "sweat-equity" model, that a woman has a greater
interest in the embryos because of her "greater physical and emotional contribution
to the IVF process").
146. Id. at 598 n.21. "[I]f the roles were reversed in this case, it is highly unlikely
that Junior David could force the preembryos to Mary Sue over her objection. Be-
cause she has an absolute right to seek termination of any resulting pregnancy, at least
within the first trimester, ordering her to undergo a uterine transfer would be a futil-
ity." Id.
147. Id. at 601.
148. Id. at 604.
149. Id.
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person supervising the welfare of a child,' 150 most courts fail to
apply these laws as such.151 Rather, courts are more likely to read
the word "parent" in a statute as "mother."'
15 2
C. Characteristics of Abusers
Although the criminal justice system treats male and female
child abuse offenders very differently, there are many similarities
between male and female abusers. The typical child abuser has nu-
merous problems including a negative self-image, little or no social
support system, and a lack of financial resources. 5 3 There is also a
strong correlation between drug use and neglect and abuse. 54 In a
1997 study, eighty-eight percent of social work professionals sur-
veyed found substance abuse as one of the top two problems in
families reported for child mistreatment. 55 In addition, abuse oc-
curs continually, rather than in isolated instances. 56 If a child is
abused, he or she is likely to be abused more than once. 57
While personal characteristics of abusers seem to cross gender
lines, the characteristics of the actual instances of abuse diverge
along gender lines. This is most visible in statistics dealing with
child homicide. Women who kill their children often do so in ways
in which a clear intent to kill can be inferred, like poisoning, but
men often kill their children by means of a violent, but ambiguous,
150. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when ... 2. [b]eing a
parent, guardian, or other person legally charged with the care or custody of
a child less than eighteen years old, he fails or refuses to exercise reasonable
diligence in the control of such child to prevent him from being an 'abused
child' [or] a 'neglected child' ....
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (Consol. 2000).
151. Jacobs, supra note 123, at 618 (discussing gender biases in the enforcement of
failure to protect laws); The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note 127.
152. Id. "Women are overwhelmingly prosecuted under these statutes because they
are deemed to have primary caretaking responsibilities for the children .... [B]ecause
men are increasingly more likely to be the actual perpetrators of the violence, women
are left to prevent the violence." Id.
153. ANIA WILCZYNSKI, CHILD HOMICIDE 72, 82 (1997).
154. PREVENT CHILD ABUSE AMERICA, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATISTICS
(1998), at http://www.childabuse.org/facts97.html (last visited Oct. 22, 1999) (on file
with the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
155. Id.
156. See generally PREVENT CHILD ABUSE AMERICA, AN APPROACH TO PREVENT-
ING CHILD ABUSE, http://www.preventchildabuse.org/researchctr/factsheets/
an-approach-to-prevention.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2000) (discussing cyclical pat-
terns of child abuse) (on file with the FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL).
157. Id.
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act like beating the child to death.158 Thus, when a man kills his
child, it is often done in an abusive attack meant to harm, not nec-
essarily kill, the child.159 Therefore, intent is not as easy to identify
as with the passive mother who poisons her child.160
D. Treatment of Abusers in the Criminal Justice System
Gender differences are not only visible in the crimes committed
by men and women, but also in their treatment by the criminal
justice system.' 61  Sentencing differences exist along gender
lines. 16 A woman's role in a family often determines the criminal
sentence the court will impose on her, whereas a man's role in a
family is not a determinative factor at sentencing. 63 Arguably,
"[t]he effect of a woman's sentence on her family, especially her
children, is weighed more heavily than its effect on the woman her-
self."' 64 However, this is only applied to the woman who adheres
to the traditional role of mother.1 65 Dorothy Roberts, a feminist
scholar, writes:
Although the law treats mothers who commit general crimes rel-
atively leniently so that they may fulfill their traditional role, it
treats women who commit crimes as mothers the harshest for
violating the traditional role. The criminal justice system pun-
ishes female defendants according to the extent to which their
acts deviate from appropriate female behavior. 166
Considering how this analysis of the mother as the "good
mother" or the "bad mother" is used in the sentencing process, it is
not surprising that the identity of the woman and her adherence to
society's motherhood model plays a central role at trial. For exam-
ple, in the Walrond case, the defense tried to portray Ms. Walrond
as a victim, an acceptable female role worthy of sympathy, while
the defense tried to depict her as a social deviant requiring
punishment. 167
158. MANN, supra note 121, at 69-79 (discussing female patterns of child homicide).
159. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 153, at 64.
160. Id.
161. MANN, supra note 121, at 128 (discussing study which found "a few of the
predicted variables were significantly associated with the assignment of a prison sen-
tence-unemployment, prior arrest history, 'region,' gender of the victim").
162. Roberts, supra note 8, at 103.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 107.
166. Id.
167. Bernstein, supra, note 4, at B7.
FEMALE ABUSE AND NEGLECT
HI. RECONSTRUCTING THE PERCEPTION OF THE FEMALE
OFFENDER THROUGH A GENDER-NEUTRAL APPROACH TO
CHILD ABUSE LAWS
A. Expectations of "The Good Mother"
It is not unusual that stereotypical gender roles, particularly the
female role of mother, are so ingrained in the criminal law given
the pervasiveness of stereotypical gender roles throughout our cul-
ture.168 Gender expectations infiltrate every aspect of life, so much
so that from the time they are little girls, women are assigned the
role of mother.169 Little girls are given dolls to teach them respon-
sibility in caring for others and fostering their nurturing, maternal
instincts. Little boys, on the other hand, are immersed in sports
and activities that focus upon individual ability and achievement.
In her analysis of gender roles in early adolescence, journalist
Peggy Orenstein writes about a teacher who asked her sixth grade
students to imagine that everything in their lives was the same only
they were born the opposite sex.170 The responses of the students
reflected gender roles deeply ingrained in society.' 71 Orenstein
writes, "[A]lmost all of the boys' observations about gender swap-
ping involve disparaging 'have-to's whereas the girls seem wistful
and longing. By sixth grade, it is clear that both girls and boys have
learned to equate maleness with opportunity and femininity with
constraint."172
These constraints and "have-to"s emerge from society's defini-
tion of women as mothers or potential mothers and present a para-
dox to many feminists.173
A woman's status as childbearer determines her identity. Soci-
ety assigns women the enormous responsibility of childrearing.
Society not only does not pay women for this labor, but it de-
grades it as well. To the extent society values women's role as
mother, it does so only when the events of motherhood attach it
to a legal father. Despite this fact, no woman achieves her full
position in society until she gives birth to a child.174
168. Roberts, supra note 8, at 11.
169. Id. at 96-97.
170. PEGGY ORENSTEIN, SCHOOLGIRLS: YOUNG WOMEN, SELF-ESTEEM AND THE
CONFIDENCE GAP Xiii-XiV (1994).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Roberts, supra note 8, at 96-97.
174. Id. at 96.
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Whether the constraints of motherhood emerge solely from biol-
ogy or from a combination of biology and social norms, this per-
ception is so indelibly etched in our social structure that it is
unlikely to change. Feminist scholars have recently attempted to
reconcile the concept of mother with that of the liberated woman
only to find that mothers are still seen as caretakers of children
rather than full human beings in and of themselves. 17 5
"Mothers are rarely associated with resentment, erotic pleasure,
or, especially, violence. '' 176 In her book, When Women Kill,
Coramae Richey Mann writes that few Americans associate vio-
lence with females, or with the public conception of violence as a
national problem.177 However, women do commit crimes, and it is
the woman who is simultaneously the mother and the criminal that
society finds most repulsive and enigmatic. Society attempts to un-
derstand this idea by categorizing the female criminal in one of two
ways: an evil person or a victim. Never was this more clear than in
the trial of Tabitha Walrond.
B. The Bad Mother
The concept of the evil mother has been around as long as the
concept of motherhood. The evil mother plays a predominant role
in the fairy tales and literature of Western culture. 78 One feminist
author describes the bad mother in Western fairy tales as:
[S]o split off from the normal reality of "good motherhood" that
she is characterized as the bizarre or crazy persona-the "mad-
woman" consigned to "the attic" of deviance or marginality.
The "bad mother" is depicted as the figure always threatening to
exceed, to violate the norms that prescribe the boundaries and
scope of her duty. Her boundary violations have tragic conse-
quences for her community by inviting destruction upon all its
members.' 79
In fairy tales, this bad mother is often a stepmother, lacking the
nurturing and maternal characteristics of biological mothers. 180
She is the non-traditional woman who has not fulfilled her role as
mother in the natural sense, and thus wreaks havoc on the lives of
innocent children.' 8'
175. Id. at 102.
176. Ashe, supra note 10, at 82.
177. MANN, supra note 121, at 2.
178. Ashe, supra note 10, at 80.
179. Id. at 81.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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Today's social perception of bad mothers is not the evil step-
mother, but the single, urban, minority woman. 182 "Society ...
stigmatizes unwed mothers, unfit mothers, and women who do not
become mothers for violating the dominant norm.' 1 83 These wo-
men are perceived as deviant or criminal.184 One case emphasizing
society's discomfort with this population is Chambers v. Omaha
Girls Club, Inc.185 In Chambers, a woman was dismissed from her
employment when she became pregnant because the pregnancy al-
legedly set a poor example for the young women who went to the
club.186 The court ignored the fact that Chambers chose to keep
her child and work hard to raise it, and, additionally, that the father
of the child took no responsibility for it.187
By categorizing good mothers and bad mothers, society is able to
exert control over women.' 88
Legal rules reward conduct that fulfills a woman's maternal role
and punish conduct that conflicts with mothering .... Women
who do not fit the norm of the ideal mother-single and di-
vorced women, women with children in foster care, women of
color, working class and poor middle class women-require har-
sher treatment and are more dispensable. 18 9
Punishing these mothers' for non-maternal conduct enforces gen-
der roles as much as it protects children. 190
Tabitha Walrond, mothers addicted to cocaine, and mothers with
HIV who choose to procreate fail to fit the role of nurturing
mother. Thus, these women are treated quite differently from
other offenders in the criminal justice system. It is easier to label
them as bad mothers, disposing of them and their children, than to
reformulate an approach to the distinct problem of inherently fe-
male child abuse offenses.
C. A Gender-Neutral Approach
Under the law, parental rights and duties are equivalent for
mothers and fathers.' 9' However, mothers are instilled with
182. Roberts, supra note 8, at 105-06.
183. Id. at 98.
184. Id.
185. 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
186. Id. at 698-99.
187. Id.
188. Roberts, supra note 8, at 98.
189. Id. at 97, 105.
190. Id. at 98.
191. Jacobs, supra note 123, at 588.
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greater responsibility for caring for children. This greater responsi-
bility is accompanied by increased liability. While feminist scholars
debate whether this is a by-product of biology or society, the fact
remains that women are treated differently by the law because of
their role as mothers.
Nowhere is this more evident than in child abuse and neglect
cases that are inherently female. The current system of approach-
ing these issues has placed the mother in conflict with her fetus,
and subsequently, her child. Even when these cases have a some-
what similar male analog, the laws are facially neutral but are ap-
plied overwhelmingly toward females.
A better way to approach these cases would be to step back from
such a gender-specific inquiry, and take a gender-neutral view of
these inherently female offenses. Although this may seem counter-
intuitive, an actual gender-neutral analysis may help provide a
stronger basis for dealing with these problems.
If society is to view women beyond the role of mother, the judi-
cial system needs to broaden the scope of its inquiry. Rather than
prosecuting women for failing to adhere to the feminine ideal, we
must prosecute them as we do men, for failing to adhere to the
laws and rules of society under an objective standard. Yet in inher-
ently female cases we seem to do the opposite. In the Walrond
case, Ms. Walrond was judged for her ability as a mother, rather
than for the result of her wrong-the death of her baby.
This does not mean that women who expose their children to
drugs in utero, or neglect their children to the point of malnourish-
ment, would go unprosecuted. Rather, it would look at the actual
danger and reasonableness of the offense. For example, it is not
reasonable to believe that exposure to crack cocaine when preg-
nant will not harm the fetus. Nor is it reasonable that a mother,
who is the primary caregiver of the child, and is solely responsible
for feeding it through her breastmilk, would have no liability when
the child dies from starvation-especially given the visual signs of
starvation he showed in his last weeks of life. However, a reasona-
ble person could believe that a seventy percent chance that a child
will be born healthy to an HIV infected mother is a worthwhile
risk. Rather than jumping to conclusions about who the mother is,
and where she fits along the spectrum of "good" and "bad" moth-
ering, her choices and conduct must be analyzed as that of a rea-
sonable person with the capacity to make choices about her
procreative freedom.
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Federal and state judicial systems should develop a list of factors
to aid them in this inquiry. Factors to be considered should in-
clude: (1) when the offense was committed; (2) how the offense
was committed (whether passively or actively); (3) the intent; (4)
the causal connection between the activity and the harm incurred;
and (5) the role of the passive parent in the action.
Under this standard, cases like that of Tabitha Walrond, and
those of women who exposed their children to drugs in utero, will
still be prosecuted without an identical male corollary. A gender-
neutral analysis will not eliminate the gender disparity in child
abuse offenses, but it will reduce it by stressing the behavior, rather
than the person engaging in the behavior. It will reduce the level
at which we condemn the female for not conforming to society's
perception of the feminine ideal.
Additionally, when there are corollary male cases, the law
should address the male defendants rather than creating additional
female duties. For example, if prosecuting the passive parent in a
domestic abuse situation is acceptable, the passive male partner of
a pregnant woman addicted to crack cocaine should not be exempt
from liability. The fifth factor reflects the role of both parents by
looking at the role of the passive parent. If it is reasonable to ex-
pect a mother to remove her child from a physically abusive part-
ner, it is just as reasonable to have expected Tyler Walrond's father
to intervene and feed his starving baby. It follows that if a mother
is presumed to be a negligent parent because she has a history of
drug abuse, it is a reasonable presumption that a father with a his-
tory of drug abuse also will be a potential danger to his child.
Arguably, the issues in the inherently female cases are so gender
specific that a gender-neutral approach may oversimplify the solu-
tion to this problem. However, the current subjectivity of the sys-
tem is often cited as the reason legislation targeted at pregnant
mothers is a potentially dangerous thing.192 How do we prosecute
the pregnant mother who did not know she was pregnant for sev-
eral months of her pregnancy, or the mother who breastfeeds and
is hormonally attached to her child, and who therefore should be
better suited to respond to his cues of hunger? To create such a
subjective standard would be nearly impossible. 193
In using a subjective approach the court would be forced to look
at whether the pregnancy was planned or unplanned, whether a
woman knew she was pregnant soon after conception, or only
192. E.g., Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (I11. 1988).
193. Schmall, supra note 43, at 305-06.
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knew after several months, whether she had the financial resources
to access the best medical care available or was unable to get any
prenatal care.194 Similarly, after the child is born, it would be nec-
essary to hold breastfeeding mothers to a higher standard consider-
ing studies that have shown "a breastfeeding mother has a
biologically programmed advantage over a bottlefeeding
mother.' 1 95 Such judgments do not make better, more effective
law enforcement of child abuse. Rather, they only succeed in fur-
ther ingraining already pervasive stereotypes.
A superior approach is one that balances the gender-neutral
analysis without discounting the unique female aspects of the situa-
tion. This can be achieved through education of parents and pro-
fessionals. If women know risks inherent in their activity while
pregnant or breastfeeding, they are more likely to treat those risks
reasonably. Similarly, if men are held accountable for their off-
spring, they will be more active in parenting.
Additionally, counseling sentences that recognize the inadequate
prenatal care available to poor pregnant women approach this bal-
ance. Counseling sentences are only successful when there are pro-
grams available to pregnant women. Drug treatment facilities
must not be allowed to continually turn away pregnant women. 196
"Forcing alcohol and drug treatment programs to admit pregnant
women will allow women who seek help for their addiction receive
it.' 97 It will also provide a basis for prosecutors to determine
whether the addicted woman acted reasonably.
A system that overwhelmingly exposes women to subjective
standards of "good" and "bad" motherhood perpetuates gender
stereotypes. A system of prosecuting offenses rather than offender
by looking at the factors set forth above, and educating parents to
prevent abuse and neglect, would diminish gender stereotypes
within the judicial system. This approach focuses on responsibility,
rejecting the perpetuation of gender stereotypes in society as a way
of shifting blame in cases of child maltreatment. Ultimately, an ob-
jective gender-neutral approach to inherently female child abuse
offenses will succeed in "releas[ing] motherhood from an institu-
tion that negates women's selfhood . . . by redirecting those
194. Id.
195. Hofheimer, supra note 21, at 440.
196. Moss, supra note 7, at 297.
197. Id.
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mothers whose reactionary acts perpetuate the current oppressive
regime of motherhood and child abuse." '198
CONCLUSION
The judicial system must reassess its treatment of the female
child abuse offender. A gender-neutral approach should be
adopted in order to guarantee the prosecution of crimes that pose a
severe harm to their vulnerable young victims, without criminaliz-
ing "bad" motherhood. This approach focuses on the crime rather
than the criminal, the action rather than inaction, and parenthood
rather than motherhood.
198. Roberts, supra note 8, at 141.
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